University of Mississippi

eGrove
Touche Ross Publications

Deloitte Collection

1980

European view: Corporate board in transition
Bohdan Hawrylyshyn

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_tr
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Tempo, Vol. 26, no. 2 (1980), p. 03-05

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Touche Ross Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please
contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

A EUROPEAN VIEW

The Corporate Board in Transition,
by B O H D A N H A W R Y L Y S H Y N / Director, CEI (International M a n a g e m e n t Institute), Geneva

oards of directors used to be
peaceful corporate sanctuaries.
Their importance, their intensity
of involvement varied across companies and countries. Some were
merely ornaments at the top of the
corporate structure; others exercised
the ultimate powers of decision in all
key areas of corporate life. Some
boards met to have a good lunch,
exchange business gossip, and
perform the necessary legal formality
of approving what had already taken
place. Others met frequently, scrutinized voluminous reports and
proposals, and made decisions that
determined the future health and
performance of the corporation. In
most cases, the boards felt secure
and unchallenged, both in their
status as the supreme governing
organ of the corporation and in their
right to perpetuate themselves.
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In the seventies, all boards came
under pressure, as a number of
factors converged. After several
decades of expansion, successful
innovations, and profits, many
corporations had to jam on the
brakes and adjust to a leaner fife. But
society's expectations, which had
matured in the heydays of growth.

could no longer be nourished easily.
Workers expected increasing
wages, job security, improved
working conditions, and more say in
management. Customers began to
compare advertised promises against
the performance of products—and
grumbling increased. Communities
whose very existence depended on
corporate decisions wanted to be
counted in. Home country governments, under pressure of inflation,
unemployment, budget, and balance
of payments deficits, demanded
greater corporate compliance with
their policies.
Host country governments wanted
the subsidiaries of foreign corporations to march more to the tune of
their national objectives and less
to the rhythm of foreign-based
corporate headquarters. Caught
between market downturns and
rising constituency demands, some
corporations could not adjust and
went off the rails. Others, in their
anxiety to continue to perform well,
resorted to such expedients as
swapping corporate favors or
greasing willing hands. News,
spreading quickly, was often blown
out of proportion; and the boards, as

the bodies ultimately responsible,
frequently looked pale under such
circumstances: not sufficiently
informed, not sufficiently knowledgeable, or not sufficiently assertive.
It is against the above background
that I shall review the nature and
direction of changes in boards—both
changes that have taken place and
those which are necessary or likely.
My approach grew from a discussion with former colleague Dr. i.|.
O'Connell, then a CEI faculty member who carried out research on
boards in six European countries; he
is now professor and dean of the
Graduate School, Bentley College,
Waltham, Mass.
Responsibilities
Boards first emerged as a group of
owners or as direct nominees of the
owners to w h o m they owed their
sole responsibility. Board members
were the custodians, protecting
property, preserving assets. The
responsibility was discharged by
appointed managers, whose achievements were summarized in an annual
report and presented to the assembly
of owners. This was the pure shareholder era of corporate life.
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W i t h time, ownership spread and
became diluted. Shareholders grew
numerous, buying and selling at will
their piece of ownership Most of
them were known only to the
company computer Thus, the links
between the owners and their representatives on the boards became
fragile. And as corporations, having
become big and potent, took on lives
of their own, their perpetuation
became more important than the
maximization of dividends or share
prices. The boards gradually shifted
their commitment to the corporation
itself and away from its owners, the
shareholders. Legally things did not
change; the instruments remained.
There were still annual reports and
the annual shareholder assemblies
with their proxy mechanism that
facilitated the self-perpetuation of
the boards.
Recently, new claimants, who
represent more organized constituencies, have begun to appeal to the
media, to the general public, and to
governments. W h i l e their nature and
power vary, the labor constituencies
have been quite significant. In such
countries as Germany or the Scandinavian nations, powerful unions have
obtained the right for employees to
be represented on boards. I he rationale is thai workers, w h o will often
stay with an enterprise throughout
their working lives, are more affected
by board decisions—and thus have
a greater stake in them—than are
anonymous shareholders who unload
their shares at the slightest negative
signal from the stock market. In some
cases, where the very survival of a
community depends on board decisions to expand or close down an
operation, local authorities also feel
that they have a critical stake in
corporate affairs and therefore
should have a say through boardroom
representation (e.g., Gothenburg
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and Volvo's operation located there.)
In the U.S., minorities, feeling that
they supply much labor but are not
asked for many ideas, have aspired
for board representation. Consumers,
for example, having been told that
they are ultimate decision makers
because they vote with their dollars,
have learned that such voting does
not always result in better, safer, or
cheaper products The promise of a
more direct vote in the boardroom
has seemed an attractive alternative.
Thus, the stakeholder era has been
born. This is the newest corporate
incarnation. If we accept the notion
of board responsibility to stakeholders rather than just to shareholders, what is the nature of that
responsibility? Clearly, the interests of
different constituencies vary and
sometimes even clash, such as higher
wages versus cheaper products. So
one responsibility of boards must be
to reconcile such interests. To achieve
this, the various stakeholder representatives must accept the fact that
their primary responsibility is to facilitate the effective functioning of
the corporation. They cannot be
spokesmen acting within the narrow
mandate of their constituencies;
rather, they must function with the
understanding that, while taking into
account the interests of their constituency, they will seek to make those
interests compatible with the basic
requirements of corporate health;
innovation, ethical behavior, profitability. Philosophically, the Dutch have
advanced the furthest along this line,
establishing the balance between
conscience and constituency; each
board member must act for the good
of the corporation according to his
good conscience, taking into account
his constituency's interests while not
being a mere spokesman for them.
If one accepts the stakeholder
concept, then new instruments and

new institutional interfaces are
required for the board to fulfill its
responsibilities to these various
stakeholders. Annual reports, which
used to focus on sales, operations,
and financial aspects, will now have
to be addressed—as is often the case
already—to different constituencies
with different content. Workers'
councils, meeting with relevant
public authorities, may be as necessary as present encounters with
financial analysts.
Roles
As responsibilities change, so must
the roles of the boards, the things
they actually do. When the responsibilities were mainly of a custodial
nature, the main tasks of boards
were verification of results, hiring,
rewarding, or sanctioning senior
managers.
As enterprises grow in size and
complexity, there is a shift of loyalty
and commitment away from owners
and toward the corporation itself.
This has involved the boards more in
the decisions about future actions.
However, given the professionalization of management, only the inside
board members tended at first to
initiate decisions. The outsiders
provided information about markets,
suppliers, sources of credit; they gave
some advice and "ratified" decisions
submitted for formal approval by
management. Since those in executive positions controlled inside information and had more directly
relevant expertise, they assumed
more power and boards became their
captives. This was facilitated by the
practice c o m m o n in North America
of the chairman also being the chief
executive officer.
With loss of management control
in some large corporations, with
unethical behavior in others, and
with board members disclaiming

responsibility in many such
instances, pressure emerged to
review the duties of boards. It
seemed advisable to separate direction, supervision,and evaluation from
the actual implementation of
decisions. Thus, the board would
define the mission and objectives of
a corporation, establish policies,
monitor their implementation,
evaluate the performance of the
corporation —including that of the
chief executive officer -arid, ideally,
assess its o w n performance. But to
carry out such an evaluation effectively the roles of the chairman and
CEO must obviously be separated. It
is difficult to preside over one's own
judgment, particularly when it is
carried out by one's subordinates.
The Structure
Boards were created originally as
single entities and long tended to
operate as such. When greater
pressure was placed on performance,
special committees evolved, such as
executive, personnel, and compensation Then, regulatory bodies
demanded the creation of audit
committees to ascertain greater
accountability.
Some countries, such as Germany,
went further. They imposed by law
two-tier boards, one supervisory and
one management. I he Germans felt
that this would automatically
separate direction and evaluation
from implementation, making boards
more independent of management
and therefore more accountable.
Elsewhere, as in Sweden, there is only
one board; but since only the
managing director in corporate
management can sit on the board,
and he does not act as its chairman,
there is an approximation of the
German practice. In North America,
the trend is in the same direction.
There is a rapid shift toward

appointing a majority of outside
members and separating the roles of
chairman and CEO, a recent case
being that of IBM, Such a shift
towards de facto, two-tier boards will
be further accelerated because such a
structure can accommodate more
readily the various stakeholder representatives on the boards, without
impeding the functioning of the
corporation.
Composition
Once the owners, or "their" men,
would sit on the boards. When the
boards were pulled into the decisionmaking process, "management's"
buddies often were invited to join
the board. The process of accession
shifted from one of appointment to
that of co-optation by the boards.
Since boards will now be more
representative in order to legitimize
the corporation vis-a-vis its various
constituencies, the trend is bound to
be toward stakeholder representatives getting on boards through a
more genuinely elective process The
two-tier boards, or their equivalent,
will become the general pattern in
order to accommodate this. This
supervisory board without executive
members will meet less frequently,
decide on major investments, make
dispositions of profits, and appoint
top executives. This will, in turn, keep
the board out of the implementation
function and reduce the potential
area of conflict between constituency representatives.
Boards must not only be independent in order to be accountable and
credible, they must also be competent, or they will not give proper
direction to corporate activities. Twotier boards assure independence, but
they do not guarantee competence,
which requires knowledge of markets,
products, technology, industry structure, competition, and trade patterns.

These requirements imply effort and
time, and anyone who sits on a board
will thus need to reduce his board
memberships in order to commit
more time to each individual board.
In the long run, it probably means
professional outside board members.
To create such a pool, earlier retirement by top executives may be desirable.
Conclusions
Like any organism, a board consists
of several components which have to
be compatible When one component changes, the other must follow.
Corporations function in social/political contexts which, as they evolve,
place new demands on corporations.
As the corporation's supreme
governing body, the board must
respond to such demands, accepting
new responsibilities. As responsibilities change, so must the roles, the
structure, and the composition of
boards. Only the harmonious evolution of all of these aspects can assure
both greater acceptability of and
smooth functioning by boards. Token
minority representation or audit
committee location will not suffice.
After examining the experience of
various countries, one can deduce
the general direction of change:
• Increased board responsibilities
to sectors of the population affected
by the activities of the corporation.
• Sharper segregation of direction,
monitoring, and evaluation implementation.
• A more truly elective process
• A two-tier structure or its equivalent.
• Separation of the duties of the
chairman of the board and the chief
executive officer.
Individual countries and companies may move at a different pace,
but they are likely to move in these
general directions.
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